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Is the arrival rate of a job independent of the wage that it pays? We answer this question by testing
whether unemployment insurance alters the job finding rate differentially across the wage distribution.
To do this, we use a Mixed Proportional Hazard Competing Risk Model in which we classify quantiles of
the wage distribution as competing risks faced by searching unemployed workers. Allowing for flexible
unobserved heterogeneity across spells, we find that unemployment insurance increases the likelihood that
a searcher matches to higher paying jobs relative to low or medium paying jobs, rejecting the notion that
wage offers and job arrival rates are independent. We show that dependence between wages and job offer
arrival rates explains 9% of the increase in the duration of unemployment associated with unemployment
insurance.
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1 Introduction
It is well established that an increase in unemployment insurance (UI) increases unemployment duration.1
Two primary channels have been put forward to understand the connection between UI and unemployment
duration. First, UI extensions may decrease a worker’s overall search effort and therefore increases the
time spent unemployed. Second, UI may increase the worker’s reservation wage and therefore increase their
duration of unemployment as the worker turns down low wage jobs.2 In this paper we investigate how a
change in a worker’s search effort affects his unemployment duration by asking: is the arrival rate of a job
offer independent from the wage it pays?
If the job arrival rate is independent of the wage offer, as with search models in the spirit of Pissarides
(2000), then UI affects a worker’s overall job finding rate changing their search intensity and changing the
set of acceptable wage offers. On the other hand, if UI affects a worker’s search behavior and their likelihood
of finding high wage jobs relative to low or medium wage jobs (as with search models in the spirit of Moen
(1997)), then the effect of UI is more subtle. To test for such a relationship between job arrival rates and
wages, we ask whether the semi-elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to UI receipt is constant across
the wage distribution. We formally test this assumption using a mixed proportional hazards competing risks
(MPHCR) model, with data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). We find that
the semi-elasticity of the hazard with respect to UI is not constant across the wage distribution, suggesting
that the arrival rate of a job offer depends on the wage that it pays. We then decompose the increase in
unemployment duration caused by UI and find that the correlation between arrival rates and wages accounts
for about 9% of the increase in the duration of unemployment.
Our paper contributes to the empirical literature testing the effect of UI on unemployment duration as
well as re-employment wages. With respect to unemployment duration we find positive effects of similar
magnitude to recent research using administrative data from Europe (for example Schmieder et al. (2012)).
The empirical literature on wage effects is mixed: Lalive (2007), Schmieder et al. (2016) and Card et al.
(2007) find small negative effects of UI on subsequent wages while others such as Black et al. (2003) and
Nekoei and Weber (2017) find positive effects.3 We find that UI has positive wage effects for individuals who
receive UI, although they experience longer average durations of unemployment. While most recent papers
1See for example Meyer (1990) and Schmieder et al. (2012), among others.
2See for example, Lichter (2016) for empirical work on the first channel and Barbanchon et al. (2019) for empirical work on
the second.
3See Nekoei and Weber (2017) for why the literature on wage effects is mixed.
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take a reduced form approach, which allows these papers to test the effect of UI on unemployment duration
and the resulting wage, our approach accounts for durations and wages jointly, allowing us to analyze how
UI affects search behavior and job finding rates across the wage distribution.
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we formally outline the framework we use to test the indepen-
dence of job arrival rates and wage offers. In section 3 we discuss the data and issues of selection. In section
4 we derive the likelihood function and the empirical test of the effect of UI on the hazard rate of leaving
unemployment. In section 5 we discuss the results and the robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Independence of Wages and Job Arrival Rates
In this section, we present a theoretical framework in which the arrival rate of jobs may depend on the wage
offered, and we show how a simple restriction can test their independence. The test conditions on worker
characteristics and we will refer to this simply as independence (rather than conditional independence).
Assume that there exists J different wages, where J = |J | and J = {w1, w2, . . . , wJ}, and the probability of
drawing each wage wj is P(Xi(t), w = wj, t) where t is time, and Xi(t) is worker i’s characteristics at time t.
The job arrival rate at time t for wage wj > wiR, where w
i
R is the reservation wage of worker i, is the product
of the probability the worker receives a job offer, µj(Xi(t), t), and the probability of drawing wage wj.
Under the assumption that job arrival rates are independent of wage offers, i.e. µj(Xi(t), t) = µ(Xi(t), t)
for all j, the hazard rate for wage wj is,
h(Xi(t), wj, t) = µ(Xi(t), t)P(Xi(t), w = wj, t). (2.1)
Under the assumption that the job arrival rate is not independent of the wage offer, the hazard rate for wage
wj is,
h̃(Xi(t), wj, t) = µj(Xi(t), t)P(Xi(t), w = wj, t) (2.2)
= µj(Xi(t), t). (2.3)
where P(Xi(t), w = wj, t) = 1 because the job arrival rate, µj(Xi(t), t), is specific to the wage wj.
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µ(Xi(t), t)P(Xi(t), w = wj, t)
= µ(Xi(t), t)P(Xi(t), w ≥ wR, t). (2.4)
Alternatively, if job arrival rates depend on the wage offered, the total hazard of leaving unemployment to











Assume there exists a subset Xki that does not affect the distribution of wages offered, i.e., ∂P(Xi, wj)/∂X
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0, but has an effect on the arrival rate of jobs, ∂µj(Xi, t)/∂Xki 6= 0 and ∂µ(Xi, t)/∂Xki 6= 0. Then under the













f or all wj > wiR. (2.5)
Equation 2.5 shows that under the assumption that wages are independent of job finding rates, the semi-
elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to Xki is constant for all wages wj > w
i
R.
The key to testing the independence of wages and job arrival rates is the existence of a factor Xki that
has the desired properties, importantly, that it does not change the offered wage distribution. The main
factor we consider is unemployment insurance (UI). In theory, the creation of an unemployment insurance
system could change the offered wage distribution in equilibrium, however, we consider an economy in which
there is a UI system in place and assume that the marginal user is too small to affect the aggregate wage
offer distribution. For example, an increase in individuals i′s UI benefit, i.e. and increase in Xki , does
not change the offered wage distribution, P(Xi, wj) for any j. In the case of independence, if UI rises, the
hazard rate changes uniformly across the wage distribution. Alternatively, if the job arrival rate and the
wage offered are dependent, then the semi-elasticity of the hazard rate with respect to UI differs across the
wage distribution. One structural interpretation of this test is that more generous UI allows workers to
search for more productive jobs (Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000). In Appendix Section A.1 we show how the
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semi-elasticity of the hazard rate changes with respect to UI in three canonical search models.
3 Data
We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1997), between the first year of the survey,
1997 and 2009. The survey tracks men and women in the United States over time who were between 12
and 16 in 1997, and offers individual-level information on gender, education, race, age, urban status, hourly
wage, unemployment insurance collection status, whether they are searching for a job, and their labor force
status in each surveyed year. With the information on labor force status, we are able to determine whether
an individual is employed, not employed and searching for work, or not employed and not searching for work.
We use a flow sampling approach to construct the data set that we use in our analysis. We record the
date at which an individual begins a spell by using individual transitions into a new labor force state. We
subsequently define these states as either employed or not employed. We limit the number of observations
per individual to ten and begin tracking an individual’s weekly labor force status after an individual has
completed his or her most recently obtained level of education. Our starting point follows Bowlus et al.
(1995), Eckstein and Wolpin (1995) and Engelhardt (2010) among others. When a respondent transitions
into a new labor force state, the duration is recorded as well as why the state ended. We exclude spells
in which individuals transition out of the labor force (a sample restriction employed by van den Berg and
Ridder (1998), Bontemps et al. (2000), among many others), and record the time the unemployed is in the
unemployed state and capture whether he or she became employed.
Our focus is on the manner in which individuals transition to employment, which informs our choice of
notation. We define an indicator d, which takes on a value of d = 1 when an individual transitions from a
not-employed state to employment, and d = 0 otherwise. Some of the observations are right-censored; in
these cases, we code individuals with d = 0, and assume censoring occurs randomly and adjust the estimation
accordingly. We define the competing risks to be three ranges of the wage distribution, with cut points at
the 25th and 75th percentiles. If a duration ends with a low, medium, or high wage draw, we represent the
event as dL = 1, dM = 1, and dH = 1, respectively. As discussed in section 4, we are restricted to three wage
quantiles by identification requirements. If a spell ends and the wage offer is not recorded, then we impose
di = 0 for i ∈ {L, M, H}, and assume that this censoring occurred randomly.
The sample includes observations on the respondent’s gender, years of schooling completed, race, urban
status, age, wage at the time of transition to employment, and a dummy for whether the individual is
5
collecting unemployment insurance. We define X(t) as the baseline covariates for the not employed, where
t is the duration of unemployment. The descriptive statistics of our sample while unemployed are displayed
in Table 1.
3.1 Selection
Workers are required to apply in order to receive unemployment insurance, which could cause selection bias in
our findings. The primary cause for concern is that individuals of high ability will receive a job offer quickly
and forgo UI because of the “hassle” of applying. However, there are several other factors that we cannot
control for in our analysis that may jointly affect UI take-up, job finding rates, and the wage distribution,
such as underlying labor market conditions, unobserved characteristics of previous employment spell, or their
reason for being unemployed. Since UI is the key variable of interest, we use the panel structure of our data
to test for selection on unobservables in UI take-up.
Given the panel structure of the data, we can observe up to 10 unemployment spells per person, and we can
use an individuals previous unemployment spell and previous wage as a proxy for unobserved characteristics.
This mirrors the approach of Alvarez et al. (2016b) to elicit information on a workers unobservable type. If
high ability individuals have a different take-up rate of UI and exit unemployment faster, then the average
unemployment duration of the previous unemployment spell across UI receivers would differ from that of non-
receivers. Therefore, we test for selection on unobservables by using an individual’s previous unemployment
duration as a proxy and test for differences between UI receivers and non-receivers. Similarly, we can use a
workers previous wage as a proxy to test for selection on unobservables. However, since a higher previous
wage may increase the probability an individual applies for UI, for example if UI is based on a replacement
rate, we also use the wage of the second most recent employment spell as a proxy of unobservables. In each
case, we run the following regression:
yi,s−k = β0 + β1UIi,s + β2Demoi,s−k + γi + εi,s−k (3.1)
where i denotes the individual, and s − k denotes the spell. The dependent variable, yi,s−k, is either the
previous unemployment spells duration, duri,s−1, the most recent previous log wage log(wage)i,s−1, or the
second most recent log wage log(wage)i,s−2. UIi,s is an indicator equal to one if the individual receives
unemployment insurance in the current spell, Demoi,s−k are demographic variables and γi is an individual
fixed effect.
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Column (1) of Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients from Equation 3.1 on unemployment duration,
when not including demographics or an individual fixed effect. The average duration of the previous spell
for individuals that did not receive UI during their current spell was 9.9 weeks, while the same statistic
for individuals who received UI was about half a week less. However, the difference is not statistically
significant. Column (2) shows the estimated coefficients of the same regression when including additional
demographic controls. The estimated coefficient on UI changes sign but remains insignificant. Column (3)
includes an individual fixed effect and drops time invariant demographics. The estimated coefficient on UI
when including a fixed effect decreases to 0.03 and is insignificant.
Columns (3) and (4) show the estimated coefficients when using previous log wage as a proxy for un-
observables. As both estimated coefficients on UI are positive but insignificant. The estimated coefficient
when using the previous log wage is a magnitude large than the estimated coefficient on UI when using the
second most recent wage. As mentioned earlier, if UI is based on the individuals previous wage they may
be more likely to apply for UI, thus creating a positive correlation between previous wage and current UI
receipt which is not driven by individuals unobservables. In order to control for this we use the second more
recent wage and find that the estimated coefficient is close to zero and insignificant. We take the null effect
of UI on previous duration and wages as evidence that the receipt of UI is unlikely to be correlated with
unobservables, especially after controlling for observable characteristics.
We want to emphasize that these estimated coefficients should not be interpreted as casual effects of
unemployment insurance on unemployment duration or wages because we are using future unemployment
insurance with respect to the duration and subsequent wage of the unemployment spell. Although we
attempt to control for unobservable characteristics that may affect UI take-up and unemployment duration
and wages, there remain two potentially important channels through which unobservables may play a role.
First, there may still be some time-varying unobservables that affect both UI take-up and the duration of
unemployment. Second, there may be spell-specific unobservables for which we cannot account, such as
changes in a person’s outside option. Although these unobservables may indeed be important, the nature of
the data limits our ability to directly address these concerns.
4 Empirical Specification
To test our model-implied restriction, we use an extension of the proportional hazard model from the duration
literature. The Mixed Proportional Hazard Competing Risks (MPHCR) model allows for a latent probability
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that an individual will exit to one of the “risks,” which we define as quantiles of the wage distribution.
Formally, if there exist J different wages, where J = |J | and J is the set of all wages, then the observed
failure time T is the minimum of the failure time at each wage, that is, T = mini∈J (Ti) and the cause of
failure, I, is the argument minimum. The cause of failure is observed by the wage, that is, if an individual
leaves unemployment to a wage j ∈ J , then failure is caused by matching at wj. Thus, we observed the joint
distribution (T, W) where W identifies the argument minimum I.
It is well known that without further assumptions the latent distribution of failure times is not identified
from the observed distribution (T, W) (Cox, 1959). We impose a mixed proportional hazard structure so
that latent failure times depend multiplicatively on the observed regressors, duration length and unobserved
heterogeneity. Heckman and Honoré (1989) show identification of such models relies on variation in latent
failure times with the regressors. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) relax this assumption and show that
less variation is needed with multiple independent draws from an individual’s observed distribution, that is,
multiple spells.
We rely on the MPHCR model to identify a baseline hazard across time for each wage, λwj(t), that
is constant for all individuals, an unobservable component, Vnwj , that is individual-specific and allowed to






i (t) = eβ jXi(t), for wage j, individual i,
and covariates k = 1, ..., K. Note that we allow each component to vary by wage. The functional form is
described in detail in Abbring and van den Berg (2003), from whom we borrow the notation for Xi(t) and βi.
This structure yields three dimensions of heterogeneity: matching rates across wages are heterogeneous with
respect to duration, while individuals differ by unobservable (e.g. value of leisure, search efficiency, etc.) and
observable characteristics. The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity accounts not only for individual’s
characteristics but match characteristics, i.e., firm qualities, since an individual is not assigned a fixed type
across all 10 unemployment spells.
We assume three risks, a low wage (wL), a medium wage (wM), and a high wage (wH), in which individuals
can find jobs. We are restricted to three competing risks because we observe only two continuous covariates.
Within each wage bin (competing risk), we allow the unobservable component to take one of three values,
indexed by n = {0, 1, 2}; additional values beyond three does not improve the fit of the model. Across wage
bins, we allow individuals to exhibit different “types” of unobservable heterogeneity, meaning that a type-0
in the low wage bin (V0wL) could be a type-1 in the medium wage bin, V
1
wM . If we repeatedly observe an
individual exiting to high-wage jobs, then the estimation would assign them a better “type” in the high wage
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bin.
Given the unobservable components, number of markets, and non-parametric approach, we are left to
identify a discrete distribution of agents with 33 points of support. For example, individual of type Xi(t)
with an unobservable type n = 0 across all wages will match at rate λwL(t)e
βLXi(t)V0wL for wL, at rate
λwM (t)e
βMXi(t)V0wM for wM and at rate λwH (t)e
βH Xi(t)V0wH for wH making the worker’s total hazard rate:
λ(t) = λwL(t)e
βLXi(t)V0wL + λwM (t)e
βMXi(t)V0wM + λwH (t)e
βH Xi(t)V0wH . (4.1)
The probability of observing an unemployment spell of length t ending with a wage w for the individual
described above is:






















where dj is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if w = wj is observed for j ∈ {L, M, H} and 0 otherwise.
4.1 Likelihood Function
Because we allow for three types of unobserved heterogeneity in each wage hazard the support for the
mixing distribution has 27 points. Denote pk, k = 1, . . . , 27 as the probability associated with each point
















wH )} as the set of points in the
support. Following the identification restrictions in Heckman and Honoré (1989) and Abbring and van den














f (ts, ws|Xi(t), V) (4.4)
where ts is the length of unemployment spell s, and s = 1, 2, . . . 10 indexes the spell number of the individual.
Exploiting the information contained across spells for each individual, or stratum, provides both power and
dependence between the covariates and unobservables. The total log likelihood function is:
L({pk}27k=1, {λwj(t), β j}j∈{L,M,H}, {V
n











)kj−1 where aj and k j are the scale and shape
parameters, respectively, for wage market j. In Section 5.1.2, we show our results are robust to the baseline
specification by providing the key results when using a piecewise exponential baseline hazard.
4.2 Test the Independence of Wage Offers and Job Arrival Rates
We construct and estimate the MPHCR model to test for the independence between wage offers and job
arrival rates using the UI as the factor that does not affect the offered wage distribution. We test for inde-
pendence by specifying a null hypothesis in which the semi-elasticities are constant across wages, following
(2.5). This involves placing restrictions on the coefficients of UI across wage bins/competing risks. Since
changes in individual characteristics such as age or education can change the reservation wage, we focus on
changes across the medium and high wage hazards, which we assume contain only wages higher than the
reservation wage once we condition on worker characteristics. To reiterate, we are not focused on testing
UI’s impact on the reservation wage.
Following our notation in (2.5), the semi-elasticities of the MPHCR model with respect to a specific











= βkwM , and similarly
∂h(Xi(t),wH ,t)
∂Xi(t)
h(Xi(t), wH , t)
= βkwH . (4.6)





This means that the independence assumption implies a series of linear restrictions in the MPHCR model.
We test these restrictions using a likelihood ratio test and a Wald test. Under both tests the null hypothesis
is
H0 : βUIwM = β
UI
wH . (4.8)
We estimate the likelihood function with the parameters restricted under the null hypothesis as well as
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the unrestricted likelihood function. The likelihood ratio test tests the null by comparing the restricted to
unrestricted fit of the model whereas the Wald test tests the null within the unrestricted model.
4.3 Specification Test
A key feature of the Mixed Proportional Hazard model is that unobserved heterogeneity shifts the hazard
rate proportionally for each type. While we show in subsection A.1 that many search models exhibit a
proportional hazard, Alvarez et al. (2016b) demonstrate that unobserved heterogeneity may violate propor-
tionality. Using the same strategy as in subsection 3.1, we proxy for an individuals unobservable type with
previous unemployment spells and test proportionality in the empirical hazard rates. We follow Alvarez et al.
(2016b) in constructing the empirical hazard rate for three types based on previous duration. We expand on
their test by including competing risks, which for our present application implies that proportionally holds
within each quantile of the wage distribution.
We bin individuals with a previous duration between 1-10 weeks, 11-20 weeks and 21-30 weeks, and
calculate the empirical hazard rate for each over 52 weeks. Panel (a) of Figure 7.1 plots the hazard rate by
type over the duration of their second spell. The empirical hazard rates become noisy for longer durations
due to small sample sizes, but these roughly correspond to the same pattern. The figure shows a downward
shift of the hazard rate by duration of the first spell for short durations. The remaining panels show the
hazard rate across the wage distribution. Again for short durations, the hazards show a downward shift
across the duration of the first spell. Cutting the data into wage bins further decrease the sample size and
result in noisy empirical hazards for those with longer previous durations, especially for the high wage bin.
Our data yields hazard rates that contrast with the findings in Alvarez et al. (2016b). Using Austrian
labor market data, they find hump-shaped hazard rates that clearly violate the proportionality assumption.
However, the hazard rates calculated from our data when subject to the same test appear consistent with the
MPHCR model. The differences in the hazard rates could be due to institutional differences between Austria
and the US, as well as the relative youth of individuals in the NLSY97 during our period of observation.
While we cannot directly assess what drives the differences between our data and Alvarez et al. (2016b), we
conclude that the MPHCR model is a good fit for our data.
As a further robustness check for the reduced form approach, we simulate data using the model and
parameter estimates from Eckstein and Wolpin (1995) and estimate our reduced from model using the
simulated data in Appendix section A.2. Again, we find that the reduced form estimation is able to adequately
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capture the dynamics of a more detailed structural search model.
5 Estimation Results
Table 3 shows the estimated mixing distribution points and the parameters of the baseline hazard function.4
The estimates show duration dependence to be effectively constant when conditioning on observables and
allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. These estimates are in line with other empirical studies as surveyed
in Devine and Kiefer (1991).
Table 4 provides the estimates of the demographic effects on the hazard rate. Previous work on the effect
of demographic variables on the arrival rates of jobs as well as duration dependence in unemployment yield
estimates similar to ours. For references, Devine and Kiefer (1991) and Eckstein and Van den Berg (2007)
provide in-depth surveys on the empirical search literature with the former more closely related to our work
given its focus on reduced form approaches. In terms of race and gender, our estimates are in line with
the broader wage literature as surveyed in Darity and Mason (1998) and many other places. Specifically,
we estimate that males are more likely to transition to high wage jobs and less likely to transition to low
wage jobs across all the specifications and restrictions. Hispanics are relatively less likely to transition to
any wage job while blacks are less likely to transition to high wage jobs with little or no effect on low wage
jobs. 5 With respect to education and experience, our results are in line with the classic Mincerian earnings
regressions as pioneered in Mincer (1974) and more generally surveyed in Card (1999). Specifically, we find
the level of schooling as well as a high school diploma increases the rate of transition to employment and
more so for high wage jobs. Individuals with a college diploma are less likely to transition to low and medium
wage jobs, but more likely to transition to high wage jobs. Similarly, experience, as proxied by age, increases
transition to high wage jobs and reduces transitions to low wage jobs although note the low dispersion in
our data’s age distribution. Finally, urban status increases the likelihood of matching with a high wage job,
which is in line with the empirical work surveyed in Holzer (1991).6
Similar to previous empirical work we find that UI receipt decreases the hazard rate, and as a result
increases unemployment duration. The estimated semi-elasticities of UI on the hazard rate in the unrestricted
model are −1.5, −1.0 and −0.5 in the low, medium and high wage markets. To compare our findings to
4The estimated probabilities pk for k = 1, .., 27 have been suppressed for brevity, but can be provided upon request.
5Bowlus (1997) and Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) are two similar examples that analyze gender and racial discrimination,
respectively, and reach similar quantitative conclusions.
6Refer to Wasmer and Zenou (2002) for modeling the dynamics in a search environment.
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the empirical literature we calculate the expected unemployment duration for individuals with and without
UI to approximate discontinuities exploited in related work. Schmieder et al. (2012), using changes in UI
benefits with age in Germany, finds that a 24 week extension from 12 months to 18 months at age 42 leads to
a 0.78 month increase in average unemployment duration. Using our estimated coefficients we calculate the
expected unemployment duration for two 42 year olds, one who receives UI for 12 months and the other for
18 months, with all other observable characteristics set to the sample means. The expected unemployment
duration for the individual when they receive UI for 12 months is 11.5 weeks and for 18 months is 14.1 weeks.
The difference in expected unemployment duration between 12 and 18 months of UI coverage is 0.5 months,
slightly less than what Schmieder et al. (2012) find. Our estimates of the effect of UI on duration are also
similar to others as well.7
Table 5 shows our main findings on the independence of wages and job finding rates. We report the
values of the restricted and unrestricted log likelihood function along with the test statistic for the likelihood
ratio test and corresponding p-value. We reject the hypothesis that the semi-elasticity of UI on the hazard
rate is the same for the medium and high wage bin, implying we reject the independence of wage offers
and job arrival rates after controlling for worker characteristics and a distribution of unobservables. The
likelihood ratio test tests the total statistical relationship between the two models therefore, to test the
structural relationship between UI and duration we also conduct a Wald test within the unrestricted model
to test if the semi-elasticity of UI is constant across the wage distribution. We report the test statistic and
corresponding p-value for the Wald test in Table 5. Again we reject the null that UI has a constant affect
on durations across the wage distribution.
Our findings indicate that UI makes workers more likely to match to high wage jobs relative to low or
medium wage jobs, although thier overall match probability decreases. This finding is consistent with a
recent empirical literature that finds a positive effect of UI on re-employment wage, for example Nekoei
and Weber (2017). Our approach also allows us to decompose changes in unemployment duration that
result from UI into the share explained by worker selectivity and the share explained by the dependence
between job finding rates and wages. Table 6 displays this decomposition. In it, we report the change
in the expected unemployment duration from the baseline hazard with and without UI. The first column
shows the expected unemployment duration conditional on matching into a medium or high wage, along
7Nekoei and Weber (2017), using an extension of Austrian unemployment benefits for individuals age 40, from 30 to 39
weeks find that the increase in generosity of UI lead to an additional 2 days of unemployment. The corresponding difference in
expected unemployment duration using our model and estimated coefficients is about 2.9 days. A similar comparison to Lalive
(2007) delivers slightly smaller effects.
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with the probabilities of each. The second column shows the same statistics in the restricted model. The
unemployment duration increases by about 0.36 weeks and the probabilities of matching into a medium
or high wage job are unchanged. Column 3 gives the total increase in unemployment duration using the
unrestricted model. In the unrestricted model, having UI increase expected unemployment duration by
about 0.4 months, implying that the dependence between job arrival rates and wages accounts for about 9%
of the total increase in unemployment duration.
5.1 Robustness
We test the robustness of the underlying specification by i) including transitions into and out of the labor
force, ii) changing the functional form of the baseline hazard, iii) changing the number of points in the
mixing distribution, and iv) controlling for spells that end in recalls. We then test the robustness of the
assumptions about reservation wages as well as the wage offer distribution by i) re-estimating the sample
with education-specific wage bins, ii) regrouping the wage bins based on a wage residual, and iii) controlling
for ability.
5.1.1 Sample Selection
Because individuals in our sample are fairly young and their labor force status may be mis-measured, we
redefine our sample to include all spells into employment. This means that we include flows from unemploy-
ment as well as flows from out of the labor force; we call this sample the “Inclusive Data Set.” Including all
spells increases our sample size to a total of 17,593 spells and allows us to include a dummy variable that
takes on the value one if an individual is actively searching for a job. Summary statistics for the Inclusive
Data Set can be found in Table 7. The average duration of a spell doubles to about 24 weeks in the inclusive
data and the average accepted wage increases from about 13 to 16.5 dollars.
Table 8 shows the value of the unrestricted and restricted log likelihood and likelihood ratio test statistic
and p-value for the Inclusive data. The test shows that we can reject the null that the semi-elasticity of
unemployment insurance is the same across the high and medium wage bins at the 7% level. The p-value
increases when using all spells of non-employment. However, the weaker result is not surprising. We expect
to see shifting transition rates for those searching specifically. If searching is not occurring, then the relative
change should be absent.
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5.1.2 Baseline Hazard Specification
Next we test the robustness of our results with respect to the baseline hazard function by repeating our tests
with a more flexible specification. We estimate the baseline hazard function using a piecewise exponential
hazard, λwj(t) = λ
q
wj , where q = 1 . . . , 6 is allowed to vary at 10 week intervals and is constant after 50
weeks. Table 9 gives the parameter estimates for the piecewise exponential baseline hazard function for both
the restricted and unrestricted models. Allowing the baseline hazard to take a more flexible form shows that
there is a small spike in the baseline hazard rate at 40 weeks across all wage bins and in both the restricted
and unrestricted model.
Table 8 reports the value of the restricted and unrestricted log likelihood as well as the resulting test
statistic and p-value. Allowing the baseline hazard to take a more flexible form increases the strength of the
test, which means that our results are not affected by varying the specification of the baseline hazard rate.
5.1.3 Varying Number of Mixing Distribution Types
We include a mixing distribution in our main specification to account for unobservables that may affect
the duration of an unemployment spell. These unobservables are spell-specific and can be thought of as
unobservable characteristics of the worker, the firm, or both. For the baseline specification we choose to
have three points in each wage bin, as a specification check we estimated the unrestricted model using two
and four points in each wage bin. Table 10 give the value of the log likelihood function for the unrestricted
model using two, three and four points of unobserved heterogeneity in each wage bin along with the test
statistic and p-value of the likelihood ratio tests, testing two vs three points and three vs four points. The
test shows that we can reject the model of two points in favor of a model of three points, and that adding a
fourth point does not significantly improve the fit of the model.
Although three points delivers the best fit, we estimate the restricted model for both two and four points
of unobserved heterogeneity in each wage bin. Table 8 gives the values of the unrestricted and restricted log
likelihood functions and the resulting test statistic and p-values for the likelihood ratio test. The results are




Recent work on unemployment duration has shown that many unemployment spells end through recall and
those that do, display a very different unemployment spell dynamic than those that do not. For example,
Fujita and Moscarini (2017) show differences in the cyclicality of recall and new employment probabilities and
Nekoei and Weber (2015) show that duration dependence changes when including recalls. Unfortunately the
NLSY does not directly ask workers if their job loss was a temporary spell of unemployment or if a transition
from unemployment to employment was a recall. However, the NLSY does track employers using unique
employer IDs so it is possible to see if a worker returned to the same employer as their previous job. Although
observing a worker returning to the same employer does not necessarily mean he was recalled, we use the
employer IDs as a proxy for recall/temporary unemployment. We create a recall dummy that takes on the
value one if a worker returned to the same employer.8 In the standard data set we find that about 12%
of spells end by recall. The percent of spells that end in recall is lower in our data than what the above
mentioned literature finds and is most likely due to how the NLSY defines unemployment. Specifically, the
NLSY labels individuals who are not searching and expecting to be recalled as not unemployed. This can
be seen from the fact that the recall rate for those not employed (whether searching or not) is greater than
20% in comparison to 12% of those unemployed. Therefore, we can not identify workers that believed to be
on temporary layoff and never got recalled, or found a different job before getting recalled.
Including our proxy for being on temporary layoff in the hazard rate we find that recalls increase the
hazard rate in all three wage bins, with the largest increase in the high wage bin.9 Table 8 gives the value
of the restricted and unrestricted log likelihood function as well as the test statistic and resulting p-value.
The tables shows that our results are robust to controlling for recalls.
5.1.5 Education
Education can affect both the unemployment duration as well as the offered wage distribution. In our main
specification, we allow the duration of unemployment to vary by years of education as well as graduation
status; however, education is not being used to determine the definition of low, medium, and high wage
thresholds. Although we restrict our main specification to compare only the medium and high wage bins in
an effort to control for changes in the reservation wage, highly educated people may still have a reservation
8This is similar to how recalls are defined in Carrillo-Tudela and Smith (2017).
9The point estimates of the model including the recall dummy have been omitted for brevity. The point estimates on recalls
in the unrestricted model are 0.57, 1.00 and 1.66 in the low, medium and high wage bin, respectively.
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wage above the low wage bin threshold due to a difference in their wage offer distributions. We re-estimate
the model under the assumption that there are separate labor markets by level of education, and given the
separate markets, we redefine low, medium, and high wages by education type in order to control for any
effects that education may have on the wage distribution.
The descriptive statics of wages by education and accompanying thresholds are provided in Table 11. The
results from the likelihood ratio tests are provided in Table 8. In the separated case, we continue to reject
the null hypothesis that the semi-elasticity of UI on unemployment duration is equal across the medium and
high wage bin when looking at those with a High School education or less. However, we fail to reject the null
in the case of the College educated. While we cannot pinpoint the source of this discrepancy, we believe the
difference may be caused by low number of unemployment spells (384) for college educated workers relative
to the number of parameters being estimated. To make the robustness check comparable we kept the number
of unobservable types at 3 for each wage bin, for a total of 27 types. If this is overfitting the data, adding
one more degree of freedom, by allowing the semi-elasticity of the hazard rate to vary across the wage bins,
would not add much to the likelihood function.
5.1.6 Wage Residual
Similar to education, other observable characteristics may affect both the wage offer distribution as well as
the unemployment duration. In order to allow all of our observable characteristics to affect the wage an
individual receives we first regress wages on observables using the following specification:
wis = β0 + β1malei + β2blacki + β3hispanici + β3ageis + β4educationis + β5highschoolis + β6collegeis + εis,
(5.1)
where wis is the wage individual i matches to after spell s, malei, blacki and hispanici are indicators if
individual i is male, black or hispanic, educationis is the number of years of education individual i has going
into spell s and, highschoolis and collegeis are indicators for if individual i has graduated high school or
college going into spell s.
Next we calculate the wage residual for all individuals for which an unemployment spell ended with a
positive wage. We then redefine the wage bins as below the 25th percentile, the 25th-75th percentile, and
above the 75th percentile of the wage residual and use the new wage bins in our main specification. We
interpret this specification as allowing wages to vary by all observable characteristics and testing if the semi-
elasticity of UI on duration is equal across the unexplained, by observable characteristics, portion of the wage
17
distribution. Table 8 gives the value of the restricted and unrestricted log likelihood function as well as the
test statistic and corresponding p-value. We continue to reject the null with a p-value of 0.0013, implying
that our results are robust to controlling for all observable characteristics affecting both the duration of
unemployment as well as the resulting wage.
5.1.7 Ability
Each person in the NLSY is eligible to take the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) when
they enter the survey. The ASVAB is a standardized test that measures individuals knowledge and skill in
verbal and mathematical reasoning. As a robustness check we include a worker’s ASVAB score in addition
to other worker characteristics in our baseline specification to control for worker ability. We do not include
the ASVAB in our main specification because roughly 21% of the sample did not take the exam, and the
missing values may not be missing at random. Table 8 gives the value of the restricted and unrestricted
log likelihood function as well as the test statistic and corresponding p-value for the model which includes
ASVAB scores. We continue to reject the null that the semi-elasticity of UI on unemployment duration
across the medium and high wage bin is the same with a p-value of 0.0003; therefore our findings are robust
to controlling for individuals ability using the ASVAB score as a proxy.
6 Conclusion
Using a multi-spell mixed proportional hazards competing risks model with National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth (1997) data, we test whether the arrival rate of a job is independent of the wage it pays. Finding
that UI decrease the hazard rate of leaving unemployment differentially across the wage distribution, we
reject the independence of arrival rates and wages. Specifically, people are more likely to transition to higher
wages jobs than medium wage jobs when collecting UI. We show that this result is robust to sample selection,
specification of the baseline hazard rate and mixing distribution as well as the inclusion of proxies for ability
and recalls.
Our findings suggest that when a worker receives UI, the increase in unemployment duration is subtle.
They search less. However, they reduce their effort for the low and medium wage jobs more than high wage
jobs. Using differential rates, we decompose the change in unemployment duration caused by the receipt
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(d) High Wage
Plotted are the hazard rates conditional on the length of the previous unemployment spell. Each point is the average hazard
over a 10 week interval. Panel (a) plots the hazard rate for the full sample and the remaining panels plot the hazard rate
conditional on matching into one of the three wage bins.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Unemployed
Mean Std. Dev.
Hired (d = 1) 0.92 0.27
Duration unemployed (t) 11.15 14.2
Wage 12.81 24.24
Low wage (dL = 1) 0.22 0.41
Medium wage (dM = 1) 0.42 0.49




Education, years completed 11.75 2.25
High School, completed 0.82 0.38
College, completed 0.09 0.28
Urban 0.89 0.31
Age 22.99 3.04
UI Collected, weeks 1-9 0.12 0.32
Observations 5308
Note: Observations are based on each spell not employed and
not on each individual who could be not employed one or
more times. Durations are weekly. Transitions do not sum
to one due to right censoring. Wage bins do not sum to one
due to missing values. Missing data on wages, education, and
urban status is assumed to occur randomly and observations
are excluded from the estimation.
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Table 2: Selection on Unobservables: Standard Data
Dependent Variable Duration of Previous Unemp. Spell Log Waget−1 Log Waget−2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UI -0.502 0.227 0.0293 0.236 0.0279









Urban -1.332 -1.609 0.135 0.149
(0.854) (1.800) (0.187) (0.187)
Age -0.0870 -0.280 0.0551∗∗∗ 0.00975
(0.106) (0.198) (0.0201) (0.0457)
Hired -0.125 3.568
(2.414) (3.102)
Constant 9.919∗∗∗ 18.17∗∗∗ 13.81∗∗∗ 0.489 1.491∗
(0.303) (3.171) (4.905) (0.456) (0.897)
Fixed Effects X X X
Observations 2508 2508 2508 2474 1173
Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Mixing distribution and Baseline Hazard Rate Parameters
restricted unrestricted


















ln L -19340.0085 -19333.1813
Note: 95% bootstrap intervals in parenthesis.
25



























































Note: 95% bootstrap intervals in paren-
thesis.
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Table 5: Test Statistics
Likelihood Ratio Wald
Test Statistic 13.6544 9.9945
p-value 0.0002 0.0016




E(duration|w ∈ [wM, wH ]) 0.1256 0.4870 0.5223
Difference to UI=0 0.3614 0.3967
% of total 91 100
Prob(w = wM|w ∈ [wM, wH ]) 0.9935 0.9955 0.9885
Prob(w = wH |w ∈ [wM, wH ]) 0.0065 0.0045 0.0115
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics: Inclusive Data Set
Mean Std. Dev.
Hired (d = 1) 0.9 0.31
Duration unemployed (t) 24.34 44.06
Wage 16.56 131.04
Low wage (dL = 1) 0.21 0.41
Medium wage (dM = 1) 0.41 0.49




Education, years completed 11.79 2.31
High School, completed 0.81 0.39
College, completed 0.09 0.29
Urban 0.89 0.31
Age 22.89 2.99
UI Collected, weeks 1-9 0.05 0.22
Searched for Employment, weeks 1-9 0.39 0.45
Observations 17593
Note: Observations are based on each spell not employed and
not on each individual who could be not employed one or
more times. Durations are weekly. Transitions do not sum
to one due to right censoring. Wage bins do not sum to one
due to missing values. Missing data on wages, education, and
urban status is assumed to occur randomly and observations
are excluded from the estimation.
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Table 8: Robustness Checks
(1) Inclusive Data Set
restricted unrestricted
ln L -70360.0084 -70358.2940
Test Statistic 3.4290
p-value 0.0641
(2) Piecewise Exponential Baseline Hazard Rate
restricted unrestricted
ln L -19286.5107 -19276.1730
Test Statistic 20.6754
p-value 0.0000
(3) Varying Number of Mixing Distribution Types
2 Types 4 Types
restricted unrestricted restricted unrestricted
ln L -19377.1349 -19369.9580 -19330.9590 -19324.7941
Test Statistic 14.3539 12.3298
p-value 0.0002 0.0004
(4) Controlling for Recalls
restricted unrestricted





restricted unrestricted restricted unrestricted
ln L -14249.8313 -14245.6054 -1570.9115 -1570.8986
Test Statistic 8.4517 0.0257
p-value 0.0036 0.8728
(6) Controlling for ASVAB Score
restricted unrestricted
























Table 10: Robustness Check: Varying Number of Mixing Distribution Types
2 Types 3 Types 4 Types
ln L -19369.9580 -19333.1813 -19324.7941
Test Statistic 73.5534 16.7744
p-value 0.0000 0.9995
Table 11: Wage Distributions by Education
High School College
Mean 12.59 17.22
Std. Dev. 24.43 15.50
25th Percentile 7.33 10.00




A.1 Application to Common Models
There has been a recent emerging literature testing the assumptions of competitive search models such as
work done by Engelhardt and Rupert (2017), Moen and Godøy (2011) and Belot et al. (2018) who find
evidence that models of competitive or directed search better reflect observations about the labor market
than random search. Understanding the mechanisms through which UI affects unemployment duration has
implications for labor market policies, and models of random and directed search reach different conclusions
about the effectiveness of labor market policies.10
In this section, we analyze under what assumptions several common types of equilibrium search models
to satisfy our empirical findings. Let λ(w, X) equal the rate at which an individual transitions from not
employed to employed with a wage w where X is observable and unobservable factors affecting an individual’s
transition rate. Finally, let wR represent an individual’s reservation wage, defined such that if wi < wR, then
λ(wi, X) = 0. For a model to be consistent with our findings, the equilibrium hazard rate from unemployment









for any wi 6= wj. In other words, the model cannot yield an equilibrium in which the semi-elasticity of
the hazard rate with respect to a factor Xki that affects the job finding rate is constant across the wage
distribution.
A.1.1 Random Matching and Bargaining with Match-Specific Productivity
We start with the canonical search and matching model in which wages are negotiated using Nash Bargaining.
The model describes a wide variety of models in the literature. Following the notation and description in
Rogerson et al. (2005), one can determine the model’s equilibrium with two conditions,




(r + λ)k = αe(1 − θ)
∫ ∞
yR(b)
(y − yR(b))dF(y), (A.3)
where y is productivity, yR(b) the reservation wage, b is unemployment utility, θ is a bargaining parameter,
k is the vacancy cost for a firm to hold a job open until filled, r is the discount rate, αe is the rate a firm
matches with a worker and αω is the rate a worker matches with a firm, and λ the job destruction rate.
Given the standard equilibrium conditions,
λ(w, b) = αω f
(




because w = yR(b) + θ(y − yR(b)). Notice that the underlying unobservable characteristic that determines
the reservation wage is the unemployment utility b. Below we suppress the reservation wage’s dependence
on b, i.e. yR = yR(b), for ease of notation. If the workers unemployment utility b, is in some part a function





























































































) 6= 0. (A.7)
Given the interpretation of b and UI, the model satisfies our results as long as the wage distribution, f (y), is
not discrete or flat and bargaining exists. If the surplus was split evenly irrespective of the reservation wage,
or drawing a particular wage is uniformly distributed, then the model does not produce a semi-elasticity of
the hazard rate with respect to UI that varies across the wage distribution.
A.1.2 On-the-Job Search via Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
Again following the notation in Rogerson et al. (2005), for the simplest case where the arrival rates of job
offers while unemployed (α0) and employed (α1) are equal, α0 = α1 = α and the interest rate is approximately











where λ∗ is the separation rate, y is the productivity of the job, and b is the worker’s flow value of unem-
ployment. The support of F is [b, w̄] for some w̄ < y where the upper bound can be found using F(w̄) = 1.






(y − w)(y − b) . (A.9)
Given the p.d.f of the wage distribution, the hazard rate of matching at wage w is,






(y − w)(y − b) (A.11)






2(y − b) (A.12)
which is a constant with respect to the wage. Given this result the, on-the-job search model via Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) does not produce hazard rates in line with our empirical findings.
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A.1.3 Competitive Search via Moen (1997)




(r + s). (A.13)
The hazard rate to matching to wage wi is given by




(r + s) (A.15)
since prob(w = wi) = 1 if matching in submarket i.







w − rU +
∂rU
∂b − 1
rU − b . (A.16)
Since the value of search U must be the same across submarkets it is clear that the semi-elasticity of the
hazard rate with respect to b is not constant across wages; therefore the competitive search model via Moen
(1997) does produce hazard rates in line with our empirical findings.
A.2 Applicability of Reduced-Form Estimates
We take a flexible reduced form approach to test the assumptions used in labor market search models.
Therefore, our results can arguably be applied to the literature as a whole. However, the reduced form
approach we take still contains some structure. In particular, we use a proportional hazard function. As
a result, the identification strategy we employ may not be flexible enough to fit the entire class of search
models. To investigate the issue, we simulate data using the model and parameter estimates from Eckstein
and Wolpin (1995) and estimate our reduced from model using the simulated data. We then estimate the
Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence of our model to the true data generating model of Eckstein and Wolpin
(1995). Define q as the probability distribution of duration times produced from our reduced from estimates,
















and measures the additional data required to capture the true model using the incorrect one. The entropy
of the true distribution, H(p), measures the uncertainty of duration times, which can be interpreted as how
informative a draw from the distribution is for understanding the underlying random variable, unemployment
duration. The KL distance is the relative entropy between the true distribution of duration times and the
distribution of duration times estimated by our reduced form approach. The entropy of our reduced form
model is H(p) + DKL(p||q). If DKL = 0 then a draw from our reduced form model is exactly as informative
about the duration of unemployment as a draw from the true distribution; therefore, we use the KL distance
as a measure of how informative our reduced form model it about the true distribution of unemployment
duration times.
The Kullback-Leibler divergence values are in Table 12 where we give the KL values for the different
sub-markets estimated in Eckstein and Wolpin (1995). Although the Eckstein and Wolpin (1995) estimates
11We have changed the flow value of unemployment from z to b for consistency across examples.
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have enormous flexibility by re-estimating the parameters for each sub-market, we estimate all the markets
simultaneously. Therefore, our unobservable heterogeneity in particular is not as flexible as that found in
what we assume to be the true model.
Given the interpretation of KL, we require between 1.65% and 5.37% additional bits of information to
describe the distribution of unemployment duration using our reduced form version depending upon the
sub-market one’s considering. Given the limited amount of information required to describe the Eckstein
and Wolpin (1995) versus our reduced form estimates, we argue the reduced form estimation can adequately
capture more specific search models.
A.3 Tables
Table 12: Kullback-Leibler Divergence
Sub-Market DKL(p||q) H(p)
Black High-School Non-completers 0.0589 3.5677
Black High-School Graduates 0.0764 2.9850
Black College Non-completers 0.0597 2.3401
White High-School Non-completers 0.0657 3.0358
White High-School Graduates 0.0626 2.4240
White College Non-completers 0.046 1.7345
White College Graduates 0.0905 1.6845
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